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DEFINING OMNISCIENCE: A FEMINIST PERSPECTIVE
Daniel Diederich Farmer

In contemporary philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience is typically rendered propositionally, as the claim that God knows all true propositions (and believes none that are false). But feminist work makes clear what
even the analytic tradition sometimes confesses, namely, that propositional
knowledge is quite limited in scope. The adequacy of propositional conceptions of omniscience is therefore in question. This paper draws on the work
of feminist epistemologists to articulate alternative renderings of omniscience
which remedy the deficiencies of the traditional formulation.

In contemporary analytic philosophy of religion, the doctrine of omniscience
is typically rendered propositionally as the claim that God knows all true
propositions (and believes none that are false). There has been some tinkering with it as of late over concerns about de re and de se belief and knowledge, but the definition has by-and-large remained unchanged. Those who
argue that this whole way of thinking about knowledge (and God’s knowledge in particular) is mostly or entirely wrong-headed are few and far between. And neither William Alston’s ‘intuitive’ model of omniscience nor
Linda Zagzebski’s provocative remarks on divine ‘omnisubjectivity’ have
gained, to my knowledge, any substantial traction in the literature.1
The problems with the propositional version of the doctrine are real,
however, and my aim in this paper is accordingly to further the case of
the revisionist camp. Because particular formulations of the doctrine of
omniscience can only start from particular accounts of ‘good knowing,’ an
exploration of contemporary work in feminist epistemology, which forcefully challenges the heavily propositional focus of traditional analytic epistemology, may suggest fruitful alternatives for revising our understanding of God’s all-encompassing knowledge. I highlight three developments
in feminist work that suggest different metaphors for divine knowledge.
These insights can be synthesized, I shall argue, if we imaginatively reconnect omniscience with omnipresence. Some implications of this view are
explored at the end of the essay.
As always, the purpose of revision can never be revision for revision’s
sake. It must rather be revision for the sake of greater faithfulness to the
1
See William P. Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” Religious Studies 22.3/4 (1986); and Linda T. Zagzebski, “Omnisubjectivity,” in Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion: Volume 1, ed.
J. L. Kvanvig (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).
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witness of Scripture and the experience of the Church. I trust that my proposal will be evaluated in light of that end.
I
A central thesis of this essay is that the usual renderings of omniscience
get things precisely backwards, starting with the propositions God supposedly knows, and only later (if at all), getting to the world described by
those propositions, rather than the other way around. What better way to
call attention to this oddity than with a brisk walk through some representative samples from the literature?
As The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy has it defined under ‘divine attributes,’ “Omniscience is unlimited knowledge. According to
the most straightforward account, omniscience is knowledge of all true
propositions.”2 In Reason and Religious Belief, the authors suggest that “The
most immediately obvious way of expressing God’s omniscience is to say
that God knows everything—or better (since only true propositions can
be known), that God knows all true propositions.”3 Paul Helseth’s account is similar: “God’s knowledge is exhaustive . . . because he knows
all true propositions about everything that has been, is, and will be, and
he does so in a manner that extends to the minutiae of past, present, and
future reality.”4 In John Martin Fischer’s words, “God is taken to be omniscient. A person is omniscient just in case he believes all and only true
propositions.”5 Edward Wierenga’s definition is similar: “A being x is omniscient =df For every proposition p, if p is true then x knows p.”6 For Anthony Kenny, this is just common sense: “The doctrine of omniscience is
easy to formulate precisely: it is the doctrine that for all p, if p, then God
knows that p.”7 William Lane Craig thinks this is a bit too quick, and prefers: “S is omniscient =df For all p, if p, S knows that p and does not believe
that ~p.”8 Thus, David Basinger summarizes the consensus nicely: “To say
that God is omniscient, most philosophers and theologians agree, is to say
that he knows all true propositions and none that are false.”9
2
Edward R. Wierenga, “Divine Attributes,” in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd
edition, ed. R. Audi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).
3
Peterson et al., Reason and Religious Belief: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 56.
4
Paul K. Helseth, “The Trustworthiness of God and the Foundation of Hope,” in Beyond
the Bounds: Open Theism and the Undermining of Biblical Christianity, ed. Piper et al. (Wheaton:
Crossway Books, 2003), p. 275.
5
John M. Fischer, “Introduction: God and Freedom,” in God, Foreknowledge and Freedom,
ed. J. M. Fischer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1989), p. 4.
6
Edward R. Wierenga, The Nature of God (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), p. 37.
7
Anthony Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), p. 10.
8
William L. Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom: The Coherence of Theism: Omniscience (Leiden: Brill, 1991), p. 6.
9
David Basinger, “Middle Knowledge and Classical Christian Thought,” in Philosophy
of Religion: Selected Readings, 3rd edition, ed. Peterson et al. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2007), p. 393.
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What does this barrage of exclusively propositional renderings of omniscience tell us? Quite simply, that insofar as we ascribe to God only that
which we find praiseworthy, propositional formulations of omniscience
reflect the idealization of propositional knowledge in analytic epistemology. “It would be fatuously unjustified at best, and blasphemous at worst
to attribute to [God] some second-rate mode of knowledge.”10 Indeed. The
corollary is of course that, as our best understanding of ‘good knowledge’
evolves, so too should our conception of omniscience.
II
There have been cracks in the foundation of the reductively propositional
edifice from very early on, even if many have not found them to be threatening. Ludwig Wittgenstein for instance, once a pupil of one of the great
godfathers of analytic philosophy, Bertrand Russell, offers the following
caution. “When philosophers use a word—‘knowledge,’ ‘being,’ ‘object,’
‘I,’ ‘proposition,’ ‘name’—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one
must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in
the language which is its original home?”11 His (well-founded) fear is that
the systematic search for necessary and sufficient conditions may lead to
philosophical myopia. The safeguard against such a condition can only
be to remain attentive to the pluriformity of language. “Compare knowing
and saying,” he says, “how many feet high Mont Blanc is; how the word
‘game’ is used; how a clarinet sounds. If you are surprised that one can
know something and not be able to say it, you are perhaps thinking of a
case like the first. Certainly not of one like the third.”12 His point, put simply, is that we commonly call ‘knowledge’ far more than what passes as
such in philosophical circles (where it is assumed that what is known can
be said—that knowledge is propositional). As a result, the philosopher
must either argue that common attributions of knowledge are incorrect
(or perhaps ‘merely analogous’) or that the assumed philosophical ‘analysis’ of knowledge has been near-sighted.
Likewise, Frank Jackson’s famous ‘Mary the neuroscientist’ thoughtexperiment highlights dimensions of what we commonly call knowledge
that disappear from propositional accounts. Mary, to review, is a specialist
in the neurophysiology of vision who works in a black and white room
and investigates the world via a black and white television monitor. In
spite of her constraints, she acquires ‘all the physical information’ about
color perception. She knows, in other words, the truth-value of all propositions concerning human color perception. “What will happen,” wonders Jackson, “when Mary is released from her black and white room or is
given a colour television monitor? Will she learn anything or not? It seems
Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” p. 298.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: The German Text, With a Revised English Translation, 3rd edition, trans. G. E. M. Anscombe (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2001),
§116.
12
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §78.
10
11
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just obvious that she will learn something about the world and our visual
experience of it.”13 His point is straightforward: even though Mary in one
sense ‘knows all the facts’ about color perception before seeing (say) the
color red, in an important sense, she also learns a new fact when she sees
red for the first time. Without the experience of red, her knowledge about
the human brain’s response to ‘red’ electro-magnetic wavelengths is incomplete. Or, we might say, she knows all the propositions, but doesn’t
know everything there is to know.14
If propositional analyses of knowledge fail to capture the full scope of
human knowings, the question arises as to whether previous extrapolations to a doctrine of divine knowing might not also be problematic. The
forms of knowledge mentioned briefly above are sometimes bracketed in
traditional epistemology as concerning (merely) ‘procedural knowledge’
or ‘knowledge by acquaintance.’ But some disturbances have nevertheless
made their way over to the philosophy of religion, focused rather technically on questions of whether knowledge de re (concerning a thing) and
knowledge de se (concerning oneself, in the first person) can be reduced to
knowledge de dicto (concerning a proposition).
For human beings, knowledge de dicto need not imply knowledge de
re, and vice-versa. One may know, for example, that the fat man in the
doorway is a spy without knowing that the provost of the University is a
spy, even though the fat man in the doorway is in fact the provost of the
University (in this case one knows of the fat man, and thus of the provost,
that he is a spy—knowledge de re—without knowing that ‘the provost is
a spy’—knowledge de dicto).15 Likewise, one may know that one ought to
avoid poison ivy without knowing that one ought to avoid this plant here
(knowledge de dicto but not de re).
With respect to God’s knowledge, however, the consensus seems to be
that this distinction is of little import. For Wierenga, knowledge de re is a
species of knowledge de dicto, which means that if God “knows all true
propositions, then he will have all the de re knowledge there is.”16 Kvanvig
similarly argues that “the distinction between de re and de dicto beliefs does
not present a problem for . . . the traditional account of omniscience.”17
For either belief de re is reducible to belief de dicto, in which case there is
no problem with the traditional account, or belief de re is not straightforwardly reducible to belief de dicto, but there will nevertheless be nothing
13
Frank Jackson, “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” Philosophical Quarterly 32 (1982) (reprinted in,
and page number from, Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, ed. D. Chalmers [New York: Oxford University Press, 2002]), p. 275.
14
Zagzebski likewise uses Jackson’s argument to draw out deficiencies in an exclusively
propositional rendering of omniscience in her essay on divine “Omnisubjectivity.”
15
The example comes from Wierenga, The Nature of God, pp. 41–45 (and there seems in
part inspired by W. V. O. Quine).
16
Wierenga, The Nature of God, p. 45.
17
Jonathan L. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1986), p. 46.
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lacking in the belief de dicto that is present in the belief de re.18 Because
Kvanvig takes knowledge to be justified true belief, the criterion of justification ensures an appropriate measure of ‘epistemic intimacy’ with (at
least parts of) the object of knowledge in the assertion of God’s knowing
all true propositions. (Though any exploration of what divine epistemic
intimacy with the world might look like is lacking.)19
Regarding knowledge de se, the concern is over propositions like “Daniel is thinking” and “I am thinking,” and whether they are different or
the same (i.e., it is a puzzle concerning indexicals).20 For while God surely
knows the former, it is controversial whether or not God knows the latter.
If God fails to know that “I am thinking,” then does this call into question
propositional renderings of omniscience? The shortest answer is typically
the preferred one—namely, that if the propositions are actually different,
omniscience does not require God to know the latter (“I am thinking”).
And if they ultimately express the same proposition, then the question
does not arise in the first place.21
Through these and a variety of other maneuvers, the traditional propositional formulation of omniscience has been defended. Rather than quibble over details of the various defenses, my goal here is to take a step back,
and to see whether the propositional account is worth defending in the
first place. Has our understanding of ‘good’ or ‘perfect’ knowing evolved
sufficiently that exclusively propositional renderings of omniscience have
been superceded? I submit that this is so, and turn in what follows to recent work in feminist epistemology to make my case.
III
Before moving on, however, I should note my fundamental assumption,
already hinted at above. This assumption is simply that the doctrine of
omniscience is formulated in such a way as to ascribe only the ‘best’ kind
of knowledge to God. The form of knowledge taken to be paradigmatic
or ‘best’ is inevitably tied to contingent historical and material circumstances, and understandably varies over time. This is not to say that all
such accounts are equal, but only that change and progress are possible
with increased attentiveness to the kinds of knowings from which current
formulations of omniscience are derived. Alston’s turn to an ‘intuitive’
model of omniscience clearly follows this type of logic. Direct awareness
of all facts, he argues, though it is “too high an aspiration for our [human]
Cf. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All Knowing God, pp. 44–46.
Zagzebski’s “Omnisubjectivity” begins to fill that gap.
20
Wierenga considers (briefly) an account of omniscience that allows for the truth-value
of propositions to vary according to indexicals of self and time (cf. Wierenga, The Nature of
God, pp. 186–190). It is not, however, a substantial departure from his fundamentally propositional account.
21
Kvanvig introduces a distinction between direct and indirect grasping of a proposition,
and accounts for de se knowledge in terms of direct grasping. The proposition “I am thinking” on this view is thus identical to the proposition “Daniel is thinking,” even though God
and I grasp it differently (cf. Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, pp. 66–71).
18
19
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condition,” nevertheless “represents the fullest and most perfect realization of the cognitive ideal.”22 From this he concludes that only this kind of
knowing is properly ascribed to God. In a similar kind of move, Charles
Taliaferro argues that omniscience should be reconnected with omnipotence, for “Traditionally the notion of God’s omniscience was conceived
of as the exercise of God’s omnipotent power.”23 The doctrine of God’s
omniscience, then, is best thought of as “the claim that it is metaphysically
impossible for there to be a being with greater cognitive power.”24 This
insight has been lost, Taliaferro says, “owing to the tendency of contemporary philosophical theology to analyze the different divine attributes in
a piecemeal fashion.”25
In a sense, these deviations from the propositional formulation of omniscience represent a search for more adequate metaphors for God as ‘perfect knower.’ Here, as elsewhere, the truth of Mark Johnson’s dictum that
“philosophy is metaphor”26 is apparent. The mode of God’s knowing is not
beamed down to us on a ray of light; rather, we conceptualize that knowing, as best we can, on analogy with human knowing—with the caveat, of
course, that ‘we see through a glass darkly.’ The negative, critical moment
of feminist work in epistemology lies in the contention that propositional
ideals of human knowledge are a philosophical codification of the purportedly ‘scientific’ (and thus, in its historical origins, all-male) preference
for textbook knowledge, to the exclusion of alternative knowings.27 Thus,
the positive, reconstructive moment of feminist work recovers forms of
knowledge marginalized and maligned in traditional epistemology. If
Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” p. 297.
Charles Taliaferro, “Divine Cognitive Power,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 18.3 (1985), p. 135.
24
Taliaferro, “Divine Cognitive Power,” p. 133. (He adds also the condition that this maximal cognitive power be fully actualized.) Craig rejects Taliaferro’s proposal on rather strange
grounds. Omniscience, he says, “means simply knowledge of all things and has no intrinsic
connection with power” (Craig, Divine Foreknowledge and Human Freedom, p. 10). This strikes
me more as assertion than argument.
25
Ibid., p. 135.
26
Mark Johnson, “Philosophy’s Debt to Metaphor,” in The Cambridge Handbook of Metaphor
and Thought, ed. R. W. Gibbs, Jr. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 44. His
claim, which seems right to me, is that “Philosophical theories, like all theoretical constructions, are elaborations of conceptual metaphors.”
27
For a compelling historical example and analysis, see Vrinda Dalmiya and Linda Alcoff,
“Are ‘Old Wives’ Tales’ Justified?” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. L. Alcoff and E. Potter (London: Routledge, 1993). They chronicle “the triumph of propositional knowledge over practical knowledge” (p. 223) in the Western world during the rise of the all-male universities. The
dismissal of midwives’ practical knowledge as mere “old wives’ tales” in the beginnings of
modern medicine was problematic to say the least (and historically lethal on a number of
fronts). Those disinclined to believe in a connection between the idealization of propositions
in epistemology and the social idealization of ‘textbook knowledge’ may benefit from meditating on how natural it is for Plantinga to speak about ‘books’ of propositions describing
worlds (Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity [New York: Oxford University Press, 1979],
p. 45ff). The point is not to put the blame for the epistemic marginalization of women on
philosophers, but rather to re-emphasize the dialogical relationship between philosophy and
popular culture. Patriarchy and prejudice flow too easily from one to the other.
22
23
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these alternatives are more adequate in their description of human knowledge, perhaps they can inspire better metaphors for divine knowledge as
well. I shall argue, then, that feminist work has the potential to free us
from the mental image of omniscience as “the deity reading off all the
propositions about the world in his mental encyclopedia.”28
IV
In her “Taking Subjectivity into Account,” Lorraine Code critiques what
she calls traditional ‘S knows that p’ epistemologies.29 The critique is directed both at the propositional focus of these epistemologies (where
propositional knowledge is taken as the paradigm for knowledge as such)
and at the assumption encouraged by the symbolic codification of subjectivity (the particular knower becomes merely ‘S’), namely, that knowers
are interchangeable. Both dimensions merit careful attention, although I
focus in what follows only on the former.
Code argues, “If epistemologists require paradigms or other less formal exemplary knowledge claims, knowing other people in personal relationships is at least as worthy a contender as knowledge of everyday
objects.”30 That is, in taking the ‘S knows that p’ model of knowledge as
their paradigmatic instance of human knowing, traditional epistemologies
make primary the knowledge of objects one ‘comes across’—knowledge
of “cups, spoons, chairs, trees, and flowers”31—things we mostly know
facts about.32 But, though this is clearly one important form of human
knowing, it is not obviously emblematic of knowledge as such. “[W]hen
one considers how basic and crucial knowing other people is in the production of human subjectivity, paradigms and objectivity take on a different
aspect.” For a child “learns to respond cognitively to the people who are a
vital part of and provide access to her or his environment long before she or
he can recognize the simplest physical objects.”33 Code’s point is that the
form of knowledge emphasized in traditional epistemologies presupposes
the knowing subject’s pre-existing healthy knowledge of other people—of
whom to trust, whom to listen to, whom to obey, and so forth (children
learn about trees and cups and tables from the adults with whom they
are already in relationship, and on whom they have been epistemically
dependent all along).
Zagzebski, “Omnisubjectivity,” p. 246.
Lorraine Code, “Taking Subjectivity Into Account,” in Feminist Epistemologies, ed. L.
Alcoff and E. Potter (London: Routledge, 1993).
30
Code, “Taking Subjectivity Into Account,” p. 32.
31
Ibid.
32
The first lines of Robert Audi’s introduction to his epistemology textbook provide a telling example: “Before me is a grassy field. It has a line of trees at its far edge and is punctuated
by a spruce on its left side and a maple on its right. . . . I reach for a tall glass of iced tea, still
cold to the touch and flavored by fresh mint” (Epistemology: A Contemporary Introduction to the
Theory of Knowledge, 2nd edition [New York: Routledge, 2003], p. 1).
33
Code, “Taking Subjectivity Into Account,” p. 32.
28
29
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She suggests, as a result, that we explore what we might call ‘S knows S’
epistemologies. Knowledge of other persons, after all, appears to be more
basic and more all-encompassing than mere propositional knowledge.
One “can know that Alice is clever and not know her very well at all in
a ‘thicker’ sense. Knowing ‘facts’ (the standard S-knows-that-p substitutions) is part of such knowing, but the knowledge involved is more than
and different from its propositional parts.”34
Consider what an application of such ‘knowing other persons’ epistemologies might look like in the philosophy of religion. In the introduction
to his The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, Jonathan Kvanvig motivates
the doctrine of omniscience by quoting Psalm 139:1–4, as follows.
O Lord, you have searched me
and you know me.
You know when I sit and when I rise;
you perceive my thoughts from afar.
You discern my going out and my lying down;
you are familiar with all my ways.
Before a word is on my tongue
you know it completely, O Lord. (NIV)

In this text, Kvanvig argues, “it is difficult to avoid seeing a clear statement
. . . that God knows all there is to know.”35 And yet in spite of the multiplicity of knowledges ascribed to God in this psalm, which clearly transcend
the merely propositional, Kvanvig is “convinced that [the traditional] construal remains the proper construal of the doctrine.”36 Might not Code’s
knowing-other-persons model help retain the richness of the psalmist’s
praise? For God is not said to know propositions about the psalmist; she is
said to know the psalmist. God is ‘familiar with’ all the psalmist’s ways—a
locution intelligible if God’s knowledge is of the psalmist, but which is
obscured when it is reduced to knowledge of propositions about him. Further, the dynamic of immanence and transcendence present in the text
(‘you have searched me,’ ‘you perceive my thoughts from afar’) is erased
and flattened—to the benefit of simple transcendence—when God’s thorough knowledge of the psalmist is reduced to knowledge of ‘facts’ about
him. In brief, propositional reductions of omniscience effect a rejection
of immanent metaphors for God, a rejection which can be undone by deploying Code’s ‘knowing other persons’ model for knowledge.
Another resource for revitalizing the doctrine of divine omniscience in
response to its propositional reductions comes from the work of Vrinda
34
Ibid., p. 34. This should not be thought of as knowledge de re, unless the latter is taken in
its dimension of ‘epistemic immediacy.’ Even then, however, knowledge of another person
seems to differ substantially in nature from knowledge of an inanimate object. Notice also
that, in one’s knowledge of a person, it is very difficult to separate the ‘what’ and the ‘how’
of knowledge.
35
Kvanvig, The Possibility of an All-Knowing God, p. ix.
36
Ibid., p. xii.
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Dalmiya. In expanding on the work of Ernest Sosa, Alvin Goldman and
Linda Zagzebski in virtue epistemology, Dalmiya emphasizes the centrality of care both in the process of inquiry and as a characteristic of the
inquirer. “The heart of the cognitive moment,” she argues, “lies in selflessness (what is sometimes termed ‘objectivity’)—where we, along with
our biases and expectations, recede so that the object of knowledge can
present itself. Reflection and inquiry,” on her view, “are a constant examination of whether this submission to the object is complete.”37 The notion of submission to the object of knowledge here is crucial, for it points
to the centrality of the acknowledgment of the otherness of the object of
knowledge (person or thing) essential to knowing the other as it, she, or
he is. The significance of emphasizing care in epistemic exchanges lies in
the affirmation of the object of knowledge’s autonomy from the knowing
subject. It must be approached and known as other.
The affirmation of the known’s independence from the knower should
not be taken as the claim that true knowledge is possible only with a total
erasure of the knowing subject, for this is of course not possible (nor does
it seem desirable). Just as it is a mistake to require the object of knowledge’s conformity to the knower in the production of knowledge, so also
it would be a mistake to require the knower’s total conformity to the object of knowledge. Rather, knowledge is produced at the intersection of
subject and object. Attentive to this connection, Dalmiya argues that “Caring as an adjective of the knower is relevant for all knowledge because it
signals an effort necessary for both knowledge of things and of selves.”38
This effort, this caring about knowing the object of knowledge as it is,
or ‘care-knowing’ of the object, is lost on accounts of omniscience which
encourage portrayals of God as reading off a list of facts about us. In the
struggle against “quintessential embodiment[s] of the solitary ruling male
ego, above the fray,”39 Dalmiya’s emphasis on care-knowing motivates a
picture of God as engaged with the objects of her knowledge, in an engagement that neither overwhelms nor reduces them. (Thus, instead of
saying, as Alston does, that “The state of knowledge is constituted by the
presence of the fact known [to the knower],”40 the point is perhaps better
put as ‘knowledge is constituted in and by presence of the knower to the
person or thing known.’)
A final resource to which we will look for the task laid out lies in Alison Jaggar’s recovery of the cognitive dimensions of emotion. She contends that, in its various redefinitions of rationality, modernity simultaneously effected a redefinition of emotion. Thus emotions, because they
were not ‘reason’ (ever the pinnacle of stability, certitude and cognitive
Vrinda Dalmiya, “Why Should a Knower Care?” Hypatia 17 (2002), p. 47.
Dalmiya, “Why Should a Knower Care?” p. 47.
39
Elizabeth A. Johnson, She Who Is: The Mystery of God in Feminist Theological Discourse
(New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1994), p. 21.
40
Alston, “Does God Have Beliefs?” p. 297.
37
38
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perfection), were portrayed “as non-rational and often irrational urges
that regularly swept the body, rather as a storm sweeps over the land,”
and as ‘passions’ “imposed upon an individual, something she suffered
rather than something she did.”41 The epistemological consequence of
this construction, she notes, is a thoroughgoing mistrust of affectivity.
The feminist recovery and reconstruction of rationality thus requires
a reconstruction of emotion as well, particularly in its cognitive and
epistemic aspects.
“Just as values presuppose emotions,” Jaggar argues, “so emotions
presuppose values”42—the two are conceptually connected (she points us
to emotional-evaluative terms to illustrate this connection: “‘desirable,’
‘admirable,’ ‘contemptible,’ ‘despicable,’ ‘respectable,’ and so on”).43
Thus, if we take seriously a valuing of beauty, goodness, and justice,
then we may not speak of ‘seeing’ or ‘knowing’ these in the world apart
from emotional engagement. Your knowledge that a friend of yours is
kind, for example, is part and parcel of your being emotionally disposed
toward him in a particular way. Your knowledge that a military group
or corporation has perpetrated an injustice is, again, part and parcel of
the indignation, anger, and action it elicits from you (here again we see
the intersection of knower and known).44 And so, “rather than repressing emotion in epistemology it is necessary to rethink the relation between knowledge and emotion and construct conceptual models that
demonstrate the mutually constitutive rather than oppositional relation
between [them].”45
The implications of Jaggar’s work for the doctrine of omniscience are, I
hope, fairly clear. Traditional propositional construals of God’s knowledge
say nothing about God’s emotional engagement with her Creation. “I have
observed the misery of my people who are in Egypt,” reads the account
of the Exodus; “Indeed, I know their sufferings, and I have come down to
deliver them from the Egyptians” (Exodus 2:7–8, NRSV). The compassion
of God, which plays such a central role in the Exodus story, disappears
in propositional renderings of God’s knowledge. “I know Ephraim, and
Israel is not hidden from me” (Hosea 5:3, NRSV)—“When Israel was a
child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son” (Hosea 11:1, NRSV).
Jaggar’s emphasis on the interconnectedness of knowledge and emotion,
I submit, helps us to make sense of these affirmations in a way traditional
formulations of omniscience never could.
41
Alison Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge: Emotion in Feminist Epistemology,” Inquiry 32
(1989), p. 152.
42
Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” p. 159.
43
Ibid., p. 160.
44
Jaggar is careful to note that “Although our emotions are epistemologically indispensable, they are not epistemologically indisputable” (p. 169). That is, just as with our other
epistemic faculties, proper training and habituation are crucial in the accurate and veridical
functioning of human emotion.
45
Jaggar, “Love and Knowledge,” p. 163.
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V
Drawing from the work of Code, Dalmiya and Jaggar, I have suggested that an epistemology centered around knowing persons, caring for
the object of knowledge as autonomous other, and knowing both with
‘heart’ and ‘head’ might inform alternative renderings of the doctrine of
omniscience, renderings which avoid the pitfalls of the traditional propositional formulation. The time has come to explore a possible synthesis of
these insights.
I hinted above at the idea that propositional formulations of omniscience suppress metaphors of immanence for divine being and divine
knowing. While the central importance of God’s transcendence must be
affirmed, that affirmation must be balanced. These two dimensions of divine being and acting should not be dichotomized in an either/or. The
proper approach is both/and. For this reason, I propose to remedy the
deficiencies of the traditional definition of omniscience by grounding omniscience in omnipresence.
Elizabeth Johnson notes that “To even the casual observer it is obvious
that the Christian community ordinarily speaks about God on the model
of the ruling male human being.”46 Propositional versions of omniscience
support this model by isolating God in metaphor from the interpersonal,
other-respecting and affective dimensions of knowledge. The cumulative
effect of these isolations is a split between God’s epistemic access to Creation and God’s providential activity in Creation (which appears quite odd
in light of the tradition’s emphasis on divine simplicity). Better resources
for ‘naming towards God,’47 then, are provided when we imaginatively
reconnect God’s knowledge and presence. God knows all, on this model,
because she is present in all.
E. J. Khamara has addressed (and dismissed) models of omniscience
which portray God as an ‘omniperceiver’—an idea akin to the one just
suggested—in his “Eternity and Omniscience.”48 He argues for the conceptual independence of omniscience from affirmations of divine presence in space or time,49 and suggests that a ‘perceptual’ model of omniscience is “inappropriate because it assimilate[s] God’s knowledge of his
own creation to that of a mere spectator.”50 However, it is unclear to me
how a propositional conception of omniscience fully deflects this charge.
More to the point, Khamara’s rejection of ‘mere’ perception presupposes
and requires a sharp distinction between sensing (conceived as a form
of passivity) and cognizing (conceived as a form of activity). But just as
human cognition does not occur in a realm of Platonic Forms and human
Johnson, She Who Is, p. 33.
Ibid., p. 62.
48
E. J. Khamara, “Eternity and Omniscience,” Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1974). See esp.
p. 213ff.
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Ibid., p. 209.
50
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sensing does not entail pure passivity, so also there is no need to imagine
divine cognition of the world occurring apart from providential activity,
and yes, ‘experience,’ in the world.51 Because Khamara endorses a sharp
distinction between rational knowing and perceiving, God of course cannot be ‘just’ a perceiver. But on this point, Jaggar helpfully reminds us of
the “necessity for and interdependence of faculties that our culture has
abstracted and separated from each other: emotion and reason, evaluation
and perception, observation and action.”52
The crux of the matter, I submit, is the traditional model’s unwillingness to grant the important point that veridical knowledge of a person
or object requires the would-be knower’s openness to and engagement
with said person or object. This is true for human beings. It’s unclear
why it shouldn’t be true for God as well. Exclusively propositional accounts struggle with this real-world meshing of the ‘content’ and mode
of knowledge. By artificially isolating the ‘what’ from the ‘how,’ and by
sweeping the ‘how’ under the rug (or ignoring it altogether), we establish God’s epistemic independence from the world; but the cost of such
a move is high, and the resulting picture rather problematic. Is not the
scandal of Creation ex nihilo precisely the mystery that God would create a world that is not-God, and that she would therefore have to relate
to it—be epistemically dependent on it—as other? Against the epistemic
and providential ‘monergism’ urged upon us by the tradition, I propose a
metaphor of epistemic and providential synergism, one in which we work
alongside of and are known by God, just as she works alongside of and is
known by human beings.53
VI
Before bringing this essay to a close, it may be well worth addressing two
objections that have not been dealt with in the foregoing. The first objection I need to address concerns the question of precision in philosophical
inquiry. Does my analysis not strip the philosopher of religion of his or
her tools for progress on the philosophical and theological puzzles surrounding divine knowledge? How can one be precise with metaphors like
‘knowing other persons,’ ‘care-knowing,’ or ‘emotionally engaging with
the object of knowledge’?
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For my answer to this question, I can afford to be brief. In the timeless
words of Aristotle, “Our discussion will be adequate if it has as much
clearness as the subject-matter admits of; for precision is not to be sought
for alike in all discussions.”54 I am suggesting, in other words, that the
‘precision’ of traditional propositional renderings of omniscience is an artificial precision; and, at the end of the day, artificial precision is imprecision. Thus we ought to return to the rough ground(s) of Scripture, reason
and experience (and in particular to the interpreted experience of women
and other marginalized persons), which provides a helpful corrective to a
tradition that has become partially calcified in its insistence on imagining
God in only one way. This is not a call to imprecise thinking, but rather a
simple reminder of our limited ability to pin down, once and for all, our
great Mother and Maker.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, have I made the elementary
mistake of confusing propositions with sentences? For while sentences
may be ‘secondary,’ and inessential to knowledge as such, what is meant
by ‘proposition’ is the deep world-matching structure of a coherent sentence. And surely God must know this!
I do not know if I have confused sentences and propositions because
it is unclear to me whether or not propositions can be divorced from the
world they describe. If propositions are ‘necessary beings’ as Plantinga
and Craig believe, then the dubious ontology is well worth rejecting. Why
imagine God’s knowledge of the world as mediated through pre-existent
propositions in the first place? If on the other hand propositions are just
‘states of affairs’ (or perhaps, even more vaguely, ‘facts’), then propositional formulations of omniscience may be bland but perhaps adequate or
useful ways of describing God’s all-encompassing knowledge.
For Taliaferro, omniscience needs to be reconnected to omnipotence.
We need, on his view, to recover the metaphor of ‘cognitive power.’ But
if the foregoing is of any worth, then good knowledge requires not just
that a knower be cognitively well-endowed, but rather also and especially
that that knower be in relationship. We know best in relationship, and it
would be a shame to drop that insight when articulating conceptions of
God’s knowledge. As Charles Taylor notes, contemporary epistemological
theories “are framed as theories elaborated by an observer about an object
observed but not participated in.”55 The more fundamental recovery to be
made then, in my estimation, is less the connection between knowledge
and power than it is the connection between knowledge and presence.
Though I believe this move is a fruitful one, it might appear dangerous to some. If the all-knowing God’s object of knowledge is not ‘books’
of propositions but rather the world itself and the people in it, how then
do we maintain traditional conceptions of providence? For these precisely
54
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J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), NE 1094b12–14.
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seem to require some secret, mysterious, or transcendent knowledge in
God, such that the world-historical process is, in spite of appearances,
‘risk-free’ from her perspective.56 In short, I do not believe a formulation
of omniscience revised in the way that I have proposed can ultimately be
reconciled with so-called ‘meticulous’ conceptions of providential control.
Neither Alston57 nor Zagzebski would follow me on this point, to be sure,
but a growing number of Bible scholars, theologians and philosophers
have questioned the biblical grounding,58 theological viability59 and philosophical consistency60 of such traditional notions of providence. The debate, I am sure, will rage on. I simply note this possible implication of my
argument for those concerned with how we are to speak of God’s control
over the world. Perhaps some will take it as a further argument in favor of
risky models of providence, and others still will take it as a counter argument to all of the foregoing. Both options may be justifiable.
My patient reader may wonder if any ‘proper’ definition of omniscience will at this point be given. If I do not define omniscience as God’s
knowing all and only true propositions, how do I define it? Taking Wittgenstein’s warning61 seriously, so far as I can tell, means resisting this
urge to make tidy, reductive definitions basic. Such definitions may have
a limited place in philosophical inquiry, but if our aim is to give a broad
account of omniscience, then it is the psalmist’s delightfully rich and personal ‘definition’ which should be taken as exemplary. “You hem me in,”
he says, “behind and before; you have laid your hand upon me. Such
knowledge is too wonderful for me, too lofty for me to attain. Where can
I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence? If I go up to
56
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the heavens, you are there; if I make my bed in the depths, you are there”
(Psalm 139:5–8, NIV).
A comment of N. T. Wright’s will do quite nicely in bringing this essay
to its conclusion. Truly Christian accounts of knowing, he argues, “should
follow the great philosopher Bernard Lonergan and take love as the basic
mode of knowing, with the love of God as the highest and fullest sort of
knowing that there is, and should work, so to speak, down from there.”62
An all-loving God—this is a God who can be said to know all things, all
persons, and to be present everywhere. This is a God whose knowledge
constitutes a different kind of power from that of the ruling male. This
God is vulnerable in her transcendence; this God is empathic in her objectivity; this God is present, though indeed, she is wholly Other. In the arms
of the all-loving God, we know and are known. Our hope, then, lies in
this. “For now we see in a mirror, dimly, but then we will see face to face.
Now I know only in part; then I will know fully, even as I have been fully
known” (I Corinthians 13:12, NRSV).63
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